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I argue that there are analytic claims that, if true, can be known a 
priori, but which also can turn out to be false: they are expressive 
of merely default instructions from the language faculty to the 
conceptual system, which may be overridden by pragmatic or 
scientific considerations, in which case, of course, they would not 
be known at all, a priori or otherwise. More surprisingly, I also 
argue that they might not be, strictly speaking, conceptual: 
concepts may be importantly different from the meaning 
instructions for the words we use to express them. I will press all 
this in the context of a general Quinean “naturalism,” where the 
epistemology that interests me is “a chapter of natural science,” 
but where the science won't be Quine's behaviorism, but a 
Chomskyan theory of the “I-semantics” of “I-language.” But, 
relying on a distinction I draw between an explanatory and a 
working epistemology, I will be pressing it largely as an 
explanatory claim, not one that will have serious consequences for 
on-going philosophical practice, neither with regard to the world, 
nor, more surprisingly, even with regard to armchair “conceptual 
analysis.” As Putnam (1965/75) observed, there may be analytic 
truths, but they don't cut much philosophical ice. !
Keywords: analytic/synthetic, a priori, epistemology, I-language, 
semantics, concepts, Quine, Chomsky, Devitt, Pietroski !!
There could be few philosophers more deserving of a Festschrift than 
Nenad. I first met him in 1984 when I visited the University of Split at 
Zadar on a Fulbright. I had gone there partly out of curiosity, and partly 
as a result of my predecessor, Michael Detlefsen’s, enthusiastic 
description of this brilliant, energetic, virtually self-taught analytic 
philosopher who was, almost single-handedly, transforming Croatian 
philosophy from its largely Heideggerian focus and re-directing it to 
analytical philosophy of language, mind, logic and mathematics. I wasn’t  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disappointed. Within minutes of my arrival Nenad began racing through 
the books I had brought, quizzing me about what they contained and why 
it was important – well, we were off and running, and haven’t stopped 
since. The mix of energy, intelligence and abundant friendliness has 
always been a joy, and has brought me back to Croatia and Slovenia 
continuously since then. I’m sure his terrific effect on Croatian 
philosophy will be manifest elsewhere in this volume, but I’d like to 
mention one anecdote that testifies to it. Some years ago I served as a 
referee for the European Society for Analytic Philosophy, and, after the 
quite ‘blind’ results were in, puzzlement was expressed about how so 
many Croatians had come to be ranked so highly. I smiled and murmured, 
“Nenad” (which I hope neither he nor readers here will mind me using to 
refer to him here). OK, to work: !
1. One Shock Deserves Another !
In his (2006), “Devitt’s Shocking Idea and Analyticity without A 
Priority,” what Nenad finds shocking is what Devitt (2001) himself 
presents as a “shocking idea” that: 
the meanings of some words, including names and natural kind 
words, are causal modes of reference that are partly external to the 
head. (Devitt 2001, 477)  
Among other things, Nenad finds this notion of content “so austere it has 
little role to play in psychological explanation” (2006, 76), and so he tries 
to find a more, as he puts it, “Frutnumian” (74) approach that tries to 
combine some version of a Fregean theory of “senses,” or “ways of 
thinking of something,” with the causal insights of Putnam, Kripke and 
Devitt.  
Now, as a student of the “middle” (ca. 1960-75) Putnam, I was initially 
sympathetic to Devitt’s view myself. Causal relations between (kinds of) 
things in the world and our uses of terms certainly seem to play an 
important role in determining the reference of our terms, especially when 
we are concerned with their use in science, where it is a posteriori 
research that likely serves best in telling us about the nature of natural 
kinds that exist independently of us (a point to which I shall return). We 
don’t want the reference of a term to be at the mercy of, as Devitt (1996) 
nicely summarizes the issues, our “ignorance and error.” But I share some 
of Nenad's worry about the lack of a serious psychological role for senses 
construed as merely causal chains.  1
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 Which is not to say that Devitt and Fodor don't allow for all manner of psychological 1
links in their various causal chains. The problem for Nenad and myself, and, I suspect, 
many others, is that specific psychological/conceptual links aren't constitutive of the 
content of the caused symbol in ways that many of us think would be required in order for 
that content to enter into psychological explanations.
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There needs to be something more specifically “cognitive” than either 
Devitt’s causal histories, or Fodor’s (1991) purely referential 
“asymmetric dependencies” and (2008) “perceptual triangulations” seem 
to allow, both for reference to be adequately determined, but, as I would 
agree with Nenad insisting, in order for “content” to play a serious role in 
psychological explanation. As I have argued elsewhere (e.g. Rey 2005; 
2009), reflection on the ubiquity of “empty concepts” (e.g. ghost, 
triangle, phoneme) and “response dependent” ones (e.g. red, funny, 
immoral), as well as simply the peculiar robustness of “analytic 
intuitions” (not only “Bachelors are unmarried,” but “If John is killed, 
then John is dead,” “If John brought Bill to the party, Bill went to the 
party”) seems to me to show that external reference is clearly inadequate 
as a theory of their content. One needs, I argue, to “go inside” not merely 
the skulls, but the minds of thinkers. 
But in order to do this, one still does need to allow for the ignorance and 
error that worries Devitt, and this has seemed to many to be incompatible 
with any internal, mental condition on meaning. What I will do here is 
provide Nenad with another shock, moreover, one, unlike Devitt’s, from 
within a Frutnamian approach, and one which even allows for the very a 
priority of the analytic that Devitt explicitly rejected. I want to argue that 
there are analytic claims that, if true, can be known a priori, but which 
(here Nenad should perhaps be sitting down) also can turn out to be false
—in which case, of course, they would not be known at all, a priori or 
otherwise —and, lastly, that they might not be, strictly speaking, 2
conceptual: concepts may be importantly different from the meanings of 
the words we use to express them. 
Moreover, ironically enough, I want to do all this, in a way that Devitt 
should accept. For I want to press it in the context of a general Quinean  3
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 Maybe Nenad won't be so shocked: in his (2005a, 303) he does raise the possibility of 2
there being “empirically false analytic propositions.” However, so far as I could see, he 
doesn't pursue this possibility in that article or elsewhere, but instead seems to focus on 
ways in which analytic claims are true a posteriori (but I have to confess to feeling I 
haven't fully understood the whole of this complex article, much less read the whole of his 
extensive corpus). As Nenad knows, I'm sympathetic to some version of this latter view 
(see my 1983 and fn 12 below), but it won't be the focus of my concern here. 
Note, by the way, that care has to be taken in expressing both my view and this possible 
view of Nenad's: the usual way of understanding “analytic” is “true by virtue of 
meaning,” a usage that many have come to reject (see, e.g. Devitt 1996). I at least want to 
recommend using it to mean, rather, something like: “knowable to be true by virtue of 
being expressive of a semantic rule,” in which case there will be no contradiction in 
saying that some claim is analytic and false. (Thanks to Steven Gross for pressing me on 
this point.)
 But of course likely won't—he himself is regularly not only shocked, but is scandalized 3
by my even raising the possibility of the a priori; see his (1999). However, more recent 
conversations about the work of Frank Jackson suggest a concession along the lines 
developed here. Stay tuned.
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“naturalism,” where at least the epistemology that interests me, is “a 
chapter of natural science” (although, of course, one without his 
behaviorism, and replete with his bêtes noires: mind, meaning and 
modality). But, as will emerge shortly, I will press it largely as an 
explanatory claim, not one that will have serious consequences for on-
going working philosophical practice, neither with regard to appeals to 
the analytic, nor, slightly more surprisingly, even with regard to armchair 
“conceptual analysis.” !
2. Explanatory vs. a Working Epistemology !
Indeed, implicit in what I've just said is an important distinction, not 
noted by Quine, but crucial for my (and really, I think, for any epistemic) 
discussion: between what I will call a “working,” largely consciously 
explicit epistemology, and an “explanatory”one, or a general scientific 
account of how animals and people succeed in having and manifesting 
their remarkable cognitive abilities: the rationality, intelligence and 
frequent success of many of their efforts. Socrates in his agora and 
Descartes in his “oven,” and most “non-naturalized” epistemologists, 
seems to me centrally concerned a working epistemology, specifically 
with what people are justified or entitled to believe in consciously settling 
disputes that explicitly arise in science and ordinary life.  
Historically, of course, this sort of working epistemology has often been 
accompanied by explanatory speculations about the “origins of ideas,” of 
the sort one finds persistently in the philosophical tradition, from Plato to 
the empiricists, up to and including Quine and Davidson, most of which, 
however, are seldom informed by any serious, empirically controlled 
research. I don't want here to reiterate familiar complaints about this 
(what seems in retrospect) often irresponsible speculation, but merely 
want to emphasize how one should be careful about inferring the 
character of this explanatory epistemology from features of the working 
one. After all, there is no real reason the two should coincide: maybe 
what we fairly self-consciously do in reflection and explicit argument is 
quite different from what, as it were, our minds/brains may do, often 
unself-consciously and inexplicitly, in reasoning and learning about the 
world.  4!
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 I emphatically do not mean to be drawing a “personal”/”sub-personal” distinction here, 4
only a distinction between the obviously different purposes of a working vs. an 
explanatory epistemology (hence the “as it were”). Nor do I mean to be suggesting for a 
moment that the explanatory ascription of attitudes is in any way “normative,” as has 
many have insisted (see the exchange between myself and Ralph Wedgewood in 
McLaughlin and Cohen 2007).
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One might think that this distinction between a working and an 
explanatory epistemology is simply the familiar distinction between a 
“normative” and “descriptive” one. And perhaps it is; but I think it's 
crucial to notice how normative considerations may enter into an 
explanatory psychology in way that might differ from the role they play 
in a working one, at least until we have a sufficiently rich psychology that 
is able to unify the two. After all, one task of a “descriptive” explanatory 
psychology is surely to explain just how we and other animals come to 
understand things and succeed in so many of our efforts as well as we 
appear to do. It's not unlikely that at least some of this success is due to 
our using strategies that, given our innate endowment in our normal 
environmental niche, are immensely reliable, sometimes “rational” (Why 
did Fisher win so many chess games? He was no dope!)  However, 5
there's no obvious reason why the strategies we might employ in 
working, conscious reflection are actually those that explain an animal's 
success, especially given its specific endowment in its specific niche. 
Aside from the fact some of those successful strategies may turn out to be 
highly specialized and specific to particular domains—say, of language, 
or the folk theory of biology or mind—and there may be no general 
explanatory epistemology to be had, there's the increasingly obvious fact 
that a genuinely explanatory epistemology turns out to be immensely 
more difficult than traditional philosophers have supposed. Our working, 
reflective practice simply cannot wait on its results. 
Given our ignorance of what is genuinely responsible for our cognitive 
abilities, it may well be that the best working epistemology for the 
foreseeable future is Quine's pragmatic “Neurathianism”: in explicitly 
justifying one's claims, one starts at different places at different times, 
depending upon what serious doubts have been raised about some issue, 
much as, in Quine's familiar figure from Neurath, one repairs a boat 
while remaining afloat in it, piece by piece, standing on one side to repair 
the other, only to stand ultimately on the other to repair the first.  6!
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 Devitt (pc) has urged me to distinguish here “structural” and “causal” explanatory 5
epistemologies. Although I share his interest in the distinction, I don't see that it's relevant 
for purposes here, since normative considerations might play a role in both sorts: an 
animal's structural competencies may as much explain and underwrite its successes—the 
justification, warrant or reliability of its beliefs—as would appeals to specific causal, 
historical, perhaps evolutionary processes.
 This points to another possible difference between the working and the explanatory: 6
ruling out alternatives relevant to especially social reflection may not be the same as what 
is ruled out by explanation of success. The hypotheses that need to be ruled out by a 
linguist determining a grammar may be more various than those for a toddler acquiring it. 
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This Neurathian figure can seem to invite Quine's other familiar figure of 
“confirmation holism” whereby  7
our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense 
experience not individually, but only as a corporate body. (Quine 
1953, 38) 
a claim that he seems to treat equally as a claim about explanation as well 
as about working reflection. In his behavioristic framework,  he viewed 8
people's cognitions as essentially bundles of dispositions to assent and 
dissent that changes under the pressure of stimulation, with no particular 
disposition sacrosanct. And perhaps something like such a view is 
convenient for working purposes, where we're largely concerned with just 
such dispositions and disputes among the target sentences. But it's 
become pretty clear since the demise of behaviorism that this model 
won't suffice for explanatory ones, where, increasingly, the interest is in 
innate, mostly unconscious cognitive capacities regarding objects, minds, 
mathematics, morals, as well as what seems a relatively autonomous 
human language faculty (“HLF”) that may or may not be manifested in 
overt verbal dispositions. The crucial point for present purposes is not 
whether these latter specific proposals are true, but only to indicate how, 
while a working epistemology for the foreseeable future might well be 
Quinean, without sacrosanct “foundations,” an explanatory epistemology 
could turn out to be otherwise, based on peculiar innate principles, 
concepts, and the inputs from our perceptual modules; indeed, from an 
explanatory point of view there could turn out to be a priori knowledge 
after all, even if it would be useless for the foreseeable future in any 
working epistemology (see my 1993, 1998, and §6 below). !
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 I stress “can seem to invite” since, of course, it doesn't entail it, nor—as Quine 7
(1975/81) himself notes—need the “holism” include quite all “our statements about the 
external world,” but merely “large chunks” of them. But, if it's only large chunks, then 
there's no longer any challenge here to the a priority of logic and math, which might 
remain quite as insulated as they strikingly appear to be (Duhem didn't include them in his 
holism; one wonders why Quine thinks he really can include them in his. Indeed, one 
might well wonder about the “only” in the quote, see my 1998, 2013), as in Devitt's 
(1996) repeated claim that “there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that is 
the basis of science (whatever way that may be)” (1996, 2; see also his 2011, 21). Any 
serious claims here depend upon being far more precise about the holistic virtues of 
hypotheses—simplicity, generality, etc.—than Quine ever was (see his 1986, 493 for his 
frankness on the issue).
 Which, astoundingly, persists in the recent second edition of the (1960/2013) book 8
without a trace of acknowledgment by its introducers of the now fifty or so years of 
difficulties raised for it since the first edition! To be sure, Fodor (2000) raises Quine's 
holism as a problem for a more computational explanatory psychology, but relies 
essentially on the same (rash?) generalization from Duhem that Quine invoked (see 
previous fn). Best, I submit, to regard the jury as still out on the issue.
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In any case, without therefore abandoning a Quinean working 
epistemology, I want here to explore one strand of this possibility or, 
anyway, the possibility that some sort of “analyses of concepts” may be 
an important explanatory ingredient of our cognition, despite the fact that 
they may have a negligible role to play in our on-going explicit practices 
of working justification.  9!
3. Meaning without Truth !
As a way of making this point particularly vivid, I want to press what 
might seem at first blush the incoherent possibility that some of these 
“meaning analyses” could in fact turn out to be correct as proposals about 
the semantics of our concepts, but they may nevertheless turn out to be 
false as claims about the world. I will even press further and claim that, if 
they turned out to be correct semantic proposals, then they could provide 
us with a priori warrant as claims about the world, even if they turned 
out to be false; they would amount to a priori knowledge if they turned 
out to be true and not seriously defeasible. 
Specifically, I want to show how this possibility is raised by some recent 
proposals of Chomsky (1996, 2000) and Paul Pietroski (2005, 2010), 
according to which the HLF makes available to our cognitive and other 
“performance” systems various phonological, syntactic and at least 
rudimentary semantic material, without that material itself always having 
or determining fully semantic phenomena of reference and truth. Thus, 
Chomsky (1996) writes: 
We cannot assume that statements (let alone sentences) have truth 
conditions. At most they have something more complex: ‘truth 
indications’ in some sense. There is good evidence that words have 
intrinsic properties of sound, form, and meaning; but also open 
texture, which allows their meanings to be extended and sharpened 
in certain ways. (1996, 52, quoted in Pietroski 2005, 253) !
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 I like to think that this ought to mollify Devitt, whose opposition to the a priori surely 9
has to do largely with a working epistemology, i.e., of appeals to the a priori in scientific 
practice. After all, he isn't seriously concerned, any more than Quine was, with the actual 
explanation of our knowledge of logic, mathematics, or, for that matter, meaning; or, if he 
is, then—along with the rest of the philosophical tradition—he should be far more 
daunted by the task than his (1996, 2) claim about “the only way of knowing” allows.
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As Chomsky points out (2000,188), this proposal is a way of fleshing out 
Peter Strawson’s (1950) claim that the things that are true and false are 
standardly not sentences by themselves, but statements made on specific 
occasions in specific contexts. Distinguishing “I(nternal HLF)-
expressions” from the usual “External language”  expressions, Pietroski 10
(2010) puts it this way: 
I-expressions do not have satisfaction conditions in the same way 
that concepts do: the semantic instruction issued by “cow” is 
satisfied by fetching a concept that has a Tarskian satisfaction 
condition; and a polysemous expression like “book” may not 
determine a Tarskian satisfaction condition. (Pietroski 2010, 266) 
These days Strawson’s concerns have, of course, come to occupy center 
stage quite independently of Chomsky, especially for those participating 
in the so-called “contextualist wars” between quite number of recent 
philosophers, occasioned largely by what have come to called “Travis 
cases,” a few of which are worth very briefly noting as providing still 
more motivation for the above “radical contextualist” view of Chomsky 
and Pietroski. !
3.1. Travis Cases, “Contextualism” and Language Games !
Since the late 1970s, the philosopher, Charles Travis, has been arguing 
for what he claims is a gulf between the linguistic “meaning” of a 
sentence and its truth-conditions, by imaginatively calling attention to 
how even very innocuous sentences, such as “The kettle is black,” “The 
ink is black,” “The leaves are green,” and “John weighs 160 lbs.” He 
provides a breathtaking range of examples—hence the term “Travis 
cases.” Here are a few:  11
The Black Kettle: Contrast someone saying “The kettle is black” 
to their spouse when (a) buying one in a store, comparing it to the 
red one; (b) having bought the red one, complaining that, having 
been left on the stove, “It's black.”  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 By “External languages” I will mean the usual “languages” we ordinarily refer to, e.g. 10
Croatian, French, English, which are (I think) ordinarily understood as systems of, in part, 
conventional rules. Chomskyans do also speak of “E-languages,” which are not 
understood this way, but rather as sets of expressions of these ordinary languages, an 
extensionalist suggestion that flourished in Behaviorist approaches to linguistics, but 
which I had thought had long died out. I shall follow Chomksyans in using the “I-“ prefix 
for things associated with the HLF: thus, e.g. an I-language, I-semantics (although I 
haven't actually seen this last in use).
 See Travis (1985, 1996), Bach (1999), Borg (2004), Recanti (2004), Cappelan and 11
LePore (2005), Carston (2010) and Vincente (2012) for representative discussions of 
different ways to deal with such cases.
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Blue Ink: In one context, the ink can properly be said to be blue if 
and only if it produces blue writing when used; but in another 
context, it can only be said that the ink is blue if and only if it looks 
blue (irrespective of whether it produces blue writing when used). !
Red/green leaves: Someone paints some russet maple leaves 
green, and when ask wed what color they are now, she says “The 
leaves are green. But of course this sentence would be false if a 
Botanist asked her, ‘What color are your maple leave?’” (Travis 
2008, 111) !
Refrigerator milk: “There's no more milk in the fridge” would be 
true in reply to someone asking about what's available for 
breakfast, but false in reply to someone worried about whether the 
milk spilt in the fridge has been cleaned up, when it hasn't been. !
Weight: “John weighs 150 lbs” might be true after a big meal, or 
when he's in his normal clothes, but false otherwise. !
Cutting Grass: “John cut the grass” would be false if he failed to 
do the mowing he was hired to do, even if it was true that he had 
carefully made a small incision an each blade of grass. (Searle, 
1983). 
As I said, there has been extended controversy regarding how to treat 
these cases, into all of which there is no need to enter here.  People have 12
appealed to various devices e.g. implicIture, hidden indices, polysemy, 
precisificaitons, open texture, in the hope of preserving some vestige of 
truth conditions for a raw sentence, but Chomsky and Pietroski are 
sceptical any such devices will be sufficient for the full range of cases. 
It's interesting to align the Chomsky/Pietroski radical contextualism with 
observations of the later Wittgenstein (1953) : we play various 13
“language games” with the material the HLF makes available, and which 
we may deploy in a wide diversity of ways, for which a substantial, 
unified theory of reference or truth may not be needed or available; or, at 
any rate, is not the topic of I-semantics. A striking example of such a 
game is the variety of things we perfectly happily say about “the 
weather” and “the heavens.” We not only talk about “the heavens above,” 
but say more specifically: “The sun rose today at 6am,” and “The sky is 
blue, although it was grey earlier,” “There was a double rainbow for an 
hour,” even though, on modest scientific reflection, we know very well 
that the sun doesn't actually rise, and that there are really no such 
“things” as “the (blue/grey) sky,” or “the two rainbows,” or, come to  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 See Sperber and Wilson, D. (2005) for review of much of the relevant literature.12
 Which provided some of the inspiration for Travis' original discussions.13
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think of it, genuine particulars, “the wind” or “the rain.”  We all play 14
this fairly elaborate language game of reporting on the weather and the 
heavens without having or needing any clear answers to these questions. 
It is certainly doubtful that an I-semantics would provide them, although 
it might well provide some loose instructions about how the expressions 
can be used. 
Philosophers there are, of course, who might take these questions very 
seriously, and try to construct some “entities” to which (our uses of) the 
word “sky,” and “rainbow” might “refer.” But surely it's a fool's errand, 
and a pointless one. It's not as though such metaphysics would deepen 
our understanding of rainbows or “the sky.” But note that those of us, like 
me, who on reflection, don't believe there really are such “things” as “the 
sky,” “rainbows,” nor even any real colors of anything, quite cheerfully 
play the “heavens” language game, and even think some of our utterances 
of, e.g. “The sky is grey,” and “The sun rose at 6” as nonetheless, within 
that game, sometimes true! 
It bears stressing that this sort of relativization of truth and reference to 
context doesn’t entail any anti-realism in a way that some might suppose, 
so that one can't ever ask about reality independent of context, or 
“conversations” (as in Rorty 1978; see also Jackendoff 1983, 2006). 
There, of course, are many ways to resist such suggestions (see Devitt 
and Sterelny 1987, for some excellent ones). What I favor is simply not 
treating all conversations or language games on a par. Indeed, one 
language game that I and many philosophers and scientists (but probably 
not many other people) like to play is one that arguably plays a very 
special, explanatorily authoritative role in our thought: objective science, 
or the effort to try to find a description and explanation of worldly 
phenomena, so far as possible, independent of human interests, practices 
and (other) language games. Anyway, it seems to me that it's only in this  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 If you're unconvinced, spend a spare hour or seven seeing if you can figure out exactly 14
what “thing” we even intend to refer to with these terms: Just where is the sky, or “the 
wind”? Is the blue sky here “the same sky” as that a few miles west where it's raining, 
“the wind” the same one east of here as west? When “the sky is grey,” it's of course the 
clouds “in it” that are grey. And is it “the same sky” in which the stars reside, and into 
which we rise in an airplane, but which isn't the least bit blue “up close”? And just where 
are those rainbows? As I speed along the highway, they seem to be “in the same place,” 
but, of course, as my angle even slightly changes, I'm continually looking at different 
raindrops in different portions of the atmosphere, as well as different rays of light. Leave 
aside rivers: it's certainly not clear that one can ever see “the same rainbow” twice!  
It is instructive to think of this odd “heavens” talk in thinking about the efforts of 
philosophers to try to determine the metaphysics of “objects” and “events” in general: the 
vase vs. its parts, Theseus' ship, hurricanes, symphonies, performances, cities, clubs, 
projects, ... Aside from cases where there might be a serious scientific purpose served by 
spelling out the metaphysics (the volume of a gas, or the shape of a “wave” in physics; 
perhaps “money” and “inflation” in economics), it's hard to see how these aren't merely 
matters of forensics and pragmatics, i.e., to be left to law courts or the practical interests 
motivating ordinary uses of language. 
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context that philosophical questions of “reality” and “realism” seriously 
arise, in which there might be a point to asking whether there really are, 
independently of our perceptual systems and language games, such 
“things” as skies and rainbows. Thus, although in the “heavens” language 
game, it might well sometimes be counted true that “the sky is blue,” in 
the objective scientific one it never is.  Moreover, it is especially in the 15
scientific enterprise that one doesn’t want to be hamstrung by ignorance 
and error, and in which therefore Kripke, Putnam and Devitt are likely 
right to insist upon often looking to the natural kind causes of the use of 
term as a determiner of reference, even though this might be irrelevant in 
many ordinary exchanges (water may well be H2O, and necessarily so, 
even though we are often referring to something much weirder when we 
ask for “water” from the fridge).  16!
4. Analyticity !
How does all this relate to analyticity? Recall the dreams of most of 20th 
C. philosophy, specifically, logical atomism, logical positivism and the 
“ordinary language philosophy” of (broadly speaking) Wittgenstein, Ryle 
and many of their followers: certain claims could be known to be true 
“independently of experience” and couldn't be refuted by it because of 
their “meaning,” “logic,” or “grammar,” discovered by some or other 
process of “analysis.” I don't want to rehearse here the many difficulties 
with all these proposals. To the contrary, I actually want to resurrect 
something like their possibility, albeit in a highly qualified way. 
If I-meanings are merely instructions to our conceptual system about 
material relevant to constructing truth-evaluable statements in various 
ways in various contexts, then it's a serious option that a speaker could 
override the instruction in view of further pragmatic or theoretical 
reasons to do so. Consequently, one could engage in at least something 
like the kind of traditional “analyses of the meanings” of ordinary terms 
without being bound to claiming that these analyses are true in all 
contexts of the use of the terms, or even in precise scientific contexts, 
where very special constraints might be in force.  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 One may be tempted to say here merely, “it isn't really true.” But notice that “The sky is 15
blue,” could be said to be "really true” on a bright, clear day within the heavens language 
game! It's in the scientific language game that it is really false in the way that (some) 
philosophers think and find it theoretically interesting that it is.
 Thus, I'm inclined to confine both my “Hypothesis of External Definitions” (Rey 1983, 16
20) and Nenad's (2005a) similar proposals, to the scientific use of language. I suspect, 
though, that Putnam (1975) is right in thinking that many of the folk may in fact still defer 
to such usage, even when they know they're speaking “loosely” with other interests in 
mind (as when they ask for water from the fridge).
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In effect, what I want to suggest is that the traditional proposals should be 
regarded not, as they usually were, as proposals in a working 
epistemology, but rather as proposals in an explanatory one, specifically 
as proposals about the I-semantic material issued by the HLF. As such, 
they are to be ascertained not by traditional armchair reflection (although 
that may provide important data), but by empirical theoretical 
investigation, along precisely the lines pursued by Chomskyans such as 
Pietroski. For just what the HLF presents to the conceptual system is not 
something we can ascertain by reflection alone. As we have seen for the 
last sixty or so years, the character and output of the HLF, e.g. merely the 
syntactic structures it produces, may be surprisingly complex and outré, 
(dis)confirmable, like all empirical linguistic claims, not only by 
evidence provided by their own acceptability intuitions about their 
language, but also by those of others about theirs, as well as evidence of 
processes of language acquisition, neural processing—indeed, as in the 
case of evidence generally, anything that might be an effect of the HLF.  17
Thus, joining others working in linguistic semantics, Pietroski posits 
fairly elaborate instructions to construct event-like structures in 2nd-order 
logic, replete with agents, patients, themes—and, for Pietroski, solely out 
of monadic predicates!—as the I-referents of verbs. He then argues, to 
my mind quite persuasively, that these “events” shouldn't necessarily be 
identified with real events in the external world: the instructions specify 
“event-like” structures that users of the language may deploy in thought 
to describe the world as they see fit.  18!
5. How Could Something Analytic Be False? !
“But how could this be?,” someone might ask, “How could, say, an 
‘instruction’ to the CI system fail to be obeyed by that system without 
equivocation, i.e., ‘a change of meaning’?” Well, on the face of it, 
instructions can still play an important causal, explanatory role in a 
person's psychology, without them always being obeyed. Someone can  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 I discuss this status of “intuitions” in my (2013) reply to Devitt (1999), who presses a 17
different view, there and in his (2013). On this issue I believe Nenad and I converge (see 
his 2006). 
 I like to think of the “event-like structures” that serve as the “I-referents” of verbs 18
(indeed of many of “things” discussed in linguistics, such as phonemes, words and 
sentences) of I-language at least often as “intentional inexistents,” á la Brentano—i.e., 
things that we “talk” about even when we know full well that they don’t exist (at all, 
nowhere, nohow). Theorists pretend they exist merely in order to express the content of 
representations that imply they do. Apparent reference to them is part of elaborate systems 
of classification not of worldly items themselves, but of mental states that have those 
(maybe non-existent) “items” as their contents. But there’s no need to pursue this point 
here; and I'm happy to remain in the end agnostic about the reality of any specific cases: 
what matters is the mere, serious epistemic possibility of unreality. See my (2006, 2012), 
but also, for welcome independent suggestions, Crane (2013).
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take fully seriously (and even arguably know a priori!) “prohibitions” 
against killing while still thinking it's OK to kill in self-defense. I-
language instructions, like moral “laws,” may be kinds of defaults for the 
construction of assertions, which can and maybe ought sometimes to be 
overridden in the light of further considerations.  
Consider, for simple example, what might seem like the most difficult 
kind of example, a stipulative definition, what Quine (1956) calls 
“legislative postulation,” e.g. I just stipulate that by “schmuncle” I mean 
“unmarried uncle.” Wouldn't this make it analytic that schmuncles are 
uncles, which I could know thereby a priori in way that could never be 
refuted by experience? 
In an important passage, Quine (1956) considers whether such 
stipulations could create a “truth by convention,” and so an analyticity:  
Might we not still speak of a sentence as forever true by 
convention if its first adoption as true was convention? No; this, if 
done seriously, involves us in the most unrewarding historical 
conjecture. Legislative postulation contributes truths to the corpus 
of truths; the artificiality of their origin does not linger as a 
localized quality, but suffuses the corpus. (Quine 1956, 119-120) 
And here he appeals to his famous justificatory holism:  
[S]urely the justification of any theoretical hypothesis can, at the 
time of hypothesis, consist in no more than the elegance and 
convenience which the hypothesis brings to the containing bodies 
of laws and data. (Quine 1956, 121) 
Suppose, for example, that Newton had himself explicitly set out “F=ma” 
as a stipulated definition of “F” (maybe inscribing it therefore in gold!). 
This wouldn't really settle the philosophical question of whether “F=ma” 
is immune to revision, since the stipulation could be overturned if it 
turned out that it and the rest of his theory didn't pan out. That is, whether 
the stipulation is to be taken seriously depends upon “the elegance and 
convenience” it brings to the rest of our theories of the world. If it doesn't 
do so, that might be a serious reason to revise it.  19
But, “Ah,” the Quinean might well reply, “it's all very well to retreat to 
default rules rather than strict ones, but what distinguishes a rule, say, 
‘Treat all Fs as G’ that's an I-semantic instruction to the CI system from  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 As, indeed, I gather Special Relativity gives as reason to do in the case of “F=ma”. 19
Pietroski has suggested to me another nice example: it could turn out that water doesn't 
boil at quite 100ºC despite “100ºC” being originally stipulated to be the temperature at 
which water boils (cp. Kripke, 1980, on the “contingent a priori). Speaking generally 
(unfortunately without examples), Harman (1996, 399) points out “just as something that 
is assumed to be true can turn out not to be true, something that is true by stipulative 
definition can turn out not to be true either.”
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simply an entrenched belief that all Fs are Gs? Here, I suggest, we ought 
avail ourselves of suggestions of a (in this regard) quite recent Quinean, 
Fodor (1987; 1991; 2008), as well as of Devitt (1996) and Horwich 
(1998). I have argued elsewhere (Rey 2009) that there's a way of 
distilling their insights from other features of their views to create the 
following proposal: the content of an internal symbol in an agent's mind 
is determined by the property of a meaningful tokening of a term that is 
explanatorily basic, the one on which all other tokens with that meaning 
synchronically, asymmetrically and explanatorily depend by virtue of that 
property.  To a first approximation, it is such properties that, I propose, 20
are being isolated by an I-semantics. They are, as it were, “policies” of 
the HLF guiding the other uses (cf. Fodor 1987). For familiar example, 
that “bachelors” is connected to “eligible male” partly guides and 
explains my calling John “a bachelor” (ceteris paribus, if I were to give 
up the former, I'd be at a loss about the latter), but not vice versa: calling 
John a “bachelor” doesn't guide and explain my thinking bachelors are 
unmarried (I could give up calling him one, without giving up the latter). 
Note that, as explanatory conditions, the I-semantic conditions, may be as 
“hidden” and non-obvious to us as the rules of its grammar (they're 
certainly not determined merely by armchair reflection in the style of 
traditional philosophy). Moreover, as only one determinant of actual 
linguistic usage, there is no problem of our violating those rules in our 
linguistic practice. Most of us have come, for example, to violate the rule 
of using the nominative case on both sides of the “is” of identity (only 
pedants and snoots say “It is I” and not “It's me”), even they still remain 
rules of our grammar (I nevertheless say “It's she who will visit him" not 
*“It's her that will visit him”).  
So this is how I propose we regard uses of “analytic” sentences in 
science, and other contexts where other considerations may lead us to 
deny them: Sure, there are the rules, just as there are, indeed, moral 
precepts against killing people, and it may be explanatorily important that 
there are, say, in theories of the language and the moral faculties; but, in 
both cases, there can be considerations that override the strict adherence 
to the rules, which, I suggest, are really only something like default 
rules.  21
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 Thus, I abstract from the (to my mind) excessive referentialism of Fodor, and the 20
excessive “reductionist,” “deflationist” and what I call “superficialist” (behavioral, 
ordinary introspective) suggestions with which Horwich burdens his own account.
 This seems a good place to mention that, in the case of “empty” terms and concepts that 21
refer to nothing, these default rules (or corresponding rules for concepts) may be the best 
we can do by way of giving an optimal account of the nature of “the phenomenon” the 
term or concept seems erroneously to be positing; which is why, pace Nenad's (2005b) 
objections to Rey (2005), I think there is room for substantive “analysis” particularly in 
the case of empty terms, where we can't defer to the external world for help. Harman 
(1998) also proposes analyses as default rules.
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6. And A Priori as well!? !
OK, so here is where I perhaps will perhaps most shock Nenad, as I've 
shocked and scandalized Devitt (1996; 1999) before him. I've elsewhere 
(Rey 1998; 2013) argued that someone might be said to have a priori 
knowledge for a claim if it was produced by an intuitively clear, 
absolutely reliable causal procedure in one's brain, as might occur, for 
example, if a Gentzen-style system of natural deduction were realized in 
one's brain and was the cause of a logically valid belief.  
I want to propose something similar for someone's claims that were 
caused by the output of her HLF, but to make this clearer, I want to want 
first to retreat (as I think I should have in my earlier discussions) to a 
notion of mere a priori “warrant” or “entitlement,” in Burge's (1993, 
458-9) sense in which someone may be epistemically warranted or 
entitled to a belief even it is not consciously accessible, and even it could 
be defeated by further empirical considerations. To a first approximation:  
A statement of “p” is “analytic a priori” iff:  
if the statement of “p” were true it could be known a priori to be so 
by virtue of a belief in it being caused and warranted by I-semantic 
instructions from one's HLF, independently of (non-HLF) beliefs or 
perceptions. 
This requires a slight emendation to Quine’s (1956) nice insight about 
legislative postulation: 
[I-semantic instructions] contribute truths to the corpus of truths; 
the [HLF psychology] of their origin does not linger as a localized 
quality, but suffuses the corpus. (121) 
In view of my distinction between a working and an explanatory 
epistemology, this actually overstates the case: Quine is right that, from 
the point of view of the ultimate working justification of a claim, neither 
stipulations nor HLF instructions remain as interesting localized qualities; 
but from the point of view of an explanatory epistemology, the HLF 
connection may retain its significance, explaining, inter alia, why people 
are warranted  in believing it without experience, and why, if it is given 22
up in a specific context, people still register some puzzlement and 
discomfort that it is. There is, after all, something to be said for 
acquiescing to the meaning constitutive I-semantic instructions, if only to 
stabilize thought and talk; and sometimes the (as it were) stipulations of 
the HLF may be just the ones to be preserved in the best science: our  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 One might wonder what place a normative term like “warrant” has in a purely 22
explanatory epistemology. But if, per §2 above, one aim of an explanatory epistemology 
is to explain how animals come to have fairly reliable beliefs about the world, then 
“warrant” in general might be understood in terms of those states and processes that 
contribute to that reliability.
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HLF might sometimes provide an apt framework for thinking about the 
world. If something for which one has a priori warrant turns out to be 
true, and the best science provides no serious “defeaters,”  then one can 23
have analytic a priori knowledge of the claim. Thus, if it's part of I-
semantics that zero is a number, then, given the utter lack of any serious 
defeaters, one may well know that a priori.  
Of course, someone might complain that this is a pretty anaemic sort of 
“a priori.” Anna-Sara Malmgren (2006), for recent example, writes:  
Any interesting notion of the a priori entails empirical 
indefeasibility: who cares if [a piece of] knowledge can be a priori 
in a weaker sense? (201) 
And perhaps, unable to trump empirical findings, a defeasible a priori 
would have little significance in a working epistemology. But it might 
still be significant for an explanatory one. After all, whatever the 
ultimate, defeasible working justification of, e.g. mathematics, there can 
be little doubt that mathematicians seem to arrive at their conclusions “by 
reason alone,” and that this requires a more serious explanation than 
merely a vague Quinean appeal to the relative centrality of mathematics 
in a pervasively defeasible web of beliefs.  24!
7. But Is It “Conceptual Analysis”? Three Examples 
I want briefly to discuss three examples that I think illustrate the 
attractions of my proposal, and also its perhaps slightly surprising 
limitation: (i) Cats are animals; (ii) gay marriage, and (ii) an aspect of the 
mind-body problem.  25
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 I say “serious” defeaters to rule out possibilities, such as “evil demon” or “brain in a 23
vat” hypotheses that we have no reason to take the least seriously, as I think no 
sufficiently “naturalized” epistemologist should. 
 Note that Kant, after all, defined the “a priori” as “justifiable independently of 24
experience”, and, so far as I have read, said nothing about “immunity to revision.” Why 
couldn't someone be perfectly rationally misled by experience to think, e.g. that quantum 
mechanics provides a reason to abandon Classical Logic? In my (1993; 1998) I argue that 
the “unrevisability” conception of the a priori was in part something foisted on us by 
behavioristically inclined Positivists, especially Quine.
 I'm taking up some standard philosophical examples, but by no means want to suggest 25
that analyticities are limited to them. As linguists have repeatedly pointed out, nouns like 
“cat,” are not the best candidates for at least I-semantic analyses; for starters, verbs are 
much better. Thus, consider the interesting properties of some, but not all English verbs, 
that allow ergativity, or use as a transitive, or as a intransitive whose subject is the object 
of the transitive, as in x cooked/boiled/baked y (which entail that y was cooked/boiled/
baked; vs. John kissed Betty but not *Betty kissed); or Chomsky's (1988, 33-4) standard 
example of If you persuaded John to go to College, then John decided to go to college, or 
what certainly seems to be the analyticity of if Alf walks/runs/trots/saunters then Alf 
moves. Much subtler discussion of the explanation of these striking phenomena are 
needed than has been supplied by Quine or his followers (e.g. Fodor 1983; 1998). 
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(i) Cats: This case is, of course, interestingly trivial. Putnam (1962) and 
Jerry Katz (1990) famously disagreed about whether “Cats are animals” 
is analytic. Putnam claimed that it could turn out that the things we called 
“cats” were actually cleverly designed (very odd) robots from Mars; Katz 
that, were this to turn out to be true, it would simply show there were no 
such things as cats, since cats “by definition” are animals. On the view 
I'm recommending, they could both be right: the HLF might well link 
“cats” to animals, and yet, for all sorts of uses of the word, we might 
override that link if our interactions with the robot/cats remained on the 
whole the same.   26
(ii) Gay Marriage: This case is obviously more socially significant. 
Some years ago, two philosophers, Adele Mercier and Rob Stainton, were 
asked by opposing sides in a case before the Canadian Supreme Court to 
provide affidavits as to whether “gay marriage” was a contradiction in 
terms. I have to confess that my initial reaction (to the understandable 
annoyance of both Adele and Rob) was to burst into gales of laughter, 
exclaiming that one could hardly encounter a better example to motivate 
Quinean scepticism about the determinacy of such questions. However, 
reflecting on it later, I realized there could be a (mildly) interesting issue 
here. I have never read the lengthy briefs submitted to the court, but I 
imagined that, on the one hand, one might argue that the word “marriage” 
in the I-languages of most “English” speakers—and perhaps the framers 
of the Canadian marriage laws—was likely linked analytically to 
“husband” and “wife,” and that “husband” was marked for male and 
“wife” for female, just in the way “he” and “she” are, so that 
consequently “gay marriage” was contradictory. Of course, these rules 
could change: perhaps in time people will no longer mark “husband” as 
male; in which case, indeed, there's been an I-meaning change. 
If all this were true, perhaps it would have legal significance. After all, 
it's reasonable—some might say, required—for the Supreme Court to 
stand by the meanings of the words the framers of the laws had in mind. 
But are the relevant “meanings” the framer's I-meanings? Well, that is a 
forensic issue in itself (about which I doubt there is much precedent), but 
if Chomsky and Pietroski are right, the I-meanings provide not truth-
conditions, but only default instructions to the conceptual system, which 
then goes on to use them to make statements in particular contexts. It's 
presumably only these latter that are the appropriate vehicles of truth-
values to which the court is obliged to attend. And, as we've noted, what 
may inform those uses can be many more considerations than the I-
semantic instructions alone, e.g. the open texture of the concepts the 
words express, the social significance of the institution, issues of  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 A lot would depend upon further details: do they still bleed, need to be fed, etc? 26
Depending upon how pervasive such robots are (how about dogs and cows?), biology 
might also have to be weirdly revised. Again, my point is merely that the issue is largely 
pragmatic/scientific, not settled merely by the (purported) I-semantics of “cats” alone. 
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compatibility with other clauses of a constitution. 
This last consideration points to a further issue of some philosophical 
interest. Particularly if Pietroski's specific proposals were correct, and the 
logical form of I-sentences may be different from the form of the 
representations used by the conceptual system,  then it could turn out 27
that the constraints on concepts aren't the same as the constraints on the 
words we use to express them. And so the fact (if it is fact) that the word 
“marriage” might be marked for genders in the above way might not 
issue in genuine contradictions –which, indeed, it certainly appears not to 
do: after all, virtually no one who hears the expression (aside perhaps 
from the not disinterested plaintiffs in the case?) regards it as remotely 
self-contradictory, in the way that they do “round square” or “number 
that's even and odd.” The concept MARRIAGE might not actually be bound 
by the I-semantics of the word “marriage.” 
Of course, it's not at all easy to get a handle on the constraints on 
concepts independently of the constraints on the words we use to express 
them, and aside from drawing attention to this potentially important 
distinction I'm afraid I have nothing particularly useful to say. 
Analogously to the project of a Chomskyan linguistics, what seems to me 
to be wanted is a distinctive explanation of what people genuinely find 
conceptually possible, such as gay marriage as opposed to a round 
square, as a consequence of the identity conditions on the concept, and 
not merely because of failures of intelligence or imagination, or 
constraints from the HLF. As in the case of I-semantics, it wouldn't be at 
all surprising that such an explanation may need to appeal to structural 
facts about the conceptual system that may not be readily available in 
thinker's surface verbal behavior.  Of course, maybe at the end of the 28
day there is no real difference between concepts and I-meanings—or, on 
the other hand, between concepts and specific intransigencies in our 
thought. But, in view of the marriage case—as well as perhaps the cases 
of “round square” and “even and odd,” which are likely not contradictory  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 For example, as I noted above in passing, Pietroski defends the interesting claim that 27
the logical form of I-sentences involves only one-place predicates, for which the 
conceptual system may well supply predicates of greater n-acity. There's no reason to 
insist on this specific theory here; I mention it only for illustrating the possibility of 
divergencies between concepts and the I-semantics of the words we might use to express 
them. 
 A possibility that recent discussions of intuition seem to me to need to take more 28
seriously. Williamson (2008), for example, dismisses appeals to “sub-personal” 
competencies as falling under the rubric of Stanovich and West's (2000, 659) “system 1” 
phenomena, which involve “quick and dirty” heuristics on which people seem standardly 
to rely for rapid judgments, as opposed to more reflective “system 2” processes (see also 
Kahneman 2011). A Chomskyan grammar would seem to be as “sub-personal” as a 
psychological phenomenon might be, but is obviously not “quick and dirty” in the way 
that perhaps a parser is. Mutatis mutandis for conceptual structure.
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due merely to I-meaning—it seems to me a distinction well worth 
considering.  Perhaps the following case will make it still more vivid: 29
(iii) Mind and Body: Consider the common puzzle about the possibility 
that computers might actually think and enjoy a mental life. In response 
to this puzzle, some philosophers seem to suggest that it may be analytic 
that a thinking thing must be alive. Thus, Wittgenstein famously writes: 
Only of a human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living 
being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; 
is conscious on unconscious. (1953, §281) 
a passage Chomsky (2000, 44) cites with approval (see also Ziff 1959, 
Hacker 1990, 156,168). And the suggestion certainly seems to accord 
with many folk intuitions: as I tried to make vivid in my (1997, ch 11), 
many people who cheerfully entertain computational explanations of 
mental process often balk at the suggestion that an inanimate machine 
engaged in those very computations would actually be undergoing those 
processes—e.g. consciously sensing, feeling, genuinely thinking. 
Let's suppose that these folk intuitions are in part explained by the I-
semantics of mental talk: it's all linked to folk biological talk. In 
accordance with the view about language sketched here, uses of it could 
nonetheless be extended to artifacts, depending on the pragmatics of the 
specific context of use, which might, of course, involve scientific, 
explanatory considerations.  
Not surprisingly, this is precisely how Chomsky (2000) thinks about the 
issue. Explicitly addressing the question of whether machines can 
“think,” he writes: 
It is not a question of fact, but a matter of decision as to whether to 
adopt a certain metaphorical usage, as when we say (in English) 
that airplanes fly but comets do not—and as for space shuttles, 
choices differ. Similarly, submarines set sail but do not swim. 
There can be no sensible debate about such topics; or about 
machine intelligence, with the many familiar variants. (2000, 114; 
see also 28, 147-8) 
But, now, it's not hard to feel that this dismissal of the issue misses 
something important. Why don't people (not only some philosophers) 
find the questions about whether machines can think (experience red, be 
in pain, be conscious) as trivial as the question of whether submarines 
swim?  Why do pretty intelligent people get confused and troubled about  30
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 For those who think “conceptual analysis” is really just theorizing about the referents of 29
concepts, I remind them of the problem posed by empty and response-dependent 
concepts, many of which (e.g. god, the good, the ghostly) also seem often to arise 
independently of the I-semantics of any specific I-language. 
 The comparison was first made by Edsger Dijkstra (1984).30
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the issue, and debate it at such length? Whatever the “mind/body” 
problem is, it's surely not an idiotic confusion! Moreover, pace 
Wittgenstein, it doesn't seem to me merely an issue about the words we 
use to describe the mind, as seems to be the case with the submarines. 
There seem to be some deeper conceptual issues. For starters, here are 
two: 
Firstly, surely one serious question that concerns people worried about 
whether artifacts could think concerns whether those artifacts could in 
fact share the real, theoretically interesting, explanatory properties of 
being a thinking thing; they are asking it presumably from the perspective 
of science. And, here, as in the case of “water” and other explanatorily 
interesting natural kind terms, we often defer to the objective structure of 
the world, as Nenad and I and Devitt agree (see §1 above). Now, of 
course, in the case of submarines, all the relevant facts are in, and so 
we're left with merely a verbal issue. However, spectacularly unlike the 
case of submarines, we are nowhere near having a satisfactory theory of 
thought or most other mental processes.  And so it's a perfectly good 31
question to wonder whether whatever goes on paradigmatically in people 
when they think also could go on in a mere machine. 
Of course, present research seems very strongly to suggest that mental 
processes are some sort of causal, often computational processes that we 
have every reason to suppose could be realized in some non-biological 
structure, e.g. a robot. At any rate, no one has provided any good reason 
to suppose that being alive is explanatorily crucial for thought.  And so 32
we might conclude that, despite these constraints of natural language, 
inanimate computers could come to “think” and have mental states after 
all. In light of this, one could, like Katz on cats, insist on adhering to 
whatever meaning constraints turn out to be imposed by natural language 
and so, perhaps, deny that inanimate computers could ever “think,” just 
as we could deny that gay people could really ever “marry.” But, if the 
explanatory and legal points were correct, it would be hard to see how 
this would amount to anything more than a verbal quibble: So, gay 
people “marry*” and artifacts “think*” instead. (It's a peculiar feature of 
the whole philosophically charged discussion of the analytic that it may 
in the end turn on mere verbal quibbles!) Or, perhaps in time, this default 
link of the I-words for the mind might change, (or we stop using the I-  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 As Chomsky (2000, 83) himself should be first to agree, given what he regards as the 31
likely deep “mysteries” surrounding the mind.
 Searle (1992) often points out, correctly enough, that mental processes in us are 32
biological, but, so far as I have read, he provides no arguments that they essentially are. 
One might think that “teleosemantic” considerations, as in, e.g. Neander (2012), would 
provide an argument, but that would only be so if stories of selection and “correct 
functioning” were confined to biology, which there is no reason to think they are (robots 
could be selected and functionally described).
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words regarding “mind”?), and the default link to only living things, 
might disappear. And people might come to wonder what the problem 
was. 
Or would they? I suspect not. For, secondly, as I argue in my (1996; 
1997), even after all the facts are in about what robots can do, there 
would still seem to be a serious resistance to the idea that they really are 
conscious, genuinely thinking, having sensations, falling in love, etc., and 
I suspect this is due to the way we not only talk, but think about and react 
to human beings as opposed to robots.  In the above quote (as in so 33
many of his later views), Wittgenstein seems to me to go wrong to call 
attention merely to what we “say”: that makes the problem he is 
addressing too ripe for Chomsky's riposte about submarines. Rather, as I 
think we saw in the case of gay marriage, the issue doesn't seem to be 
settled by issues of language alone. At any rate, there seems to me more 
to be said about our concepts of mind, sensations, consciousness (as well 
as perhaps marriage) than merely I-semantics and pragmatics alone. !
8. Conclusion !
The conclusion I want to draw is essentially a slightly more elaborate 
version of the conclusion drawn by Putnam (1965/75): although the 
analytic may reveal something of interest in an explanatory epistemology, 
it would be of limited utility in a working one. In Putnam's immortal 
words, it would “cut no philosophical ice, bake no philosophical bread 
and wash no philosophical windows” (1965/75, 36), or, anyway, not 
much: a priori warrant based on the analytic might play a role at the start 
of a discussion, setting certain default assumptions and stabilizing the 
discussion, just as stipulative “legislative postulations” do; but, as Quine 
pointed out, not really in the long run. If those stabilizing assumptions 
prove true and reasonably indefeasible, then one might end up with a 
priori knowledge. If not, then, of course, one doesn’t. 
Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, “analysis” of the meanings of our 
words may diverge from analyses of the concepts those words are used to 
express, and so, apart from linguistics, analyses of word I-meanings may 
not tell us as much as we'd like to know about the underlying concepts. 
The kind of “conceptual analysis” needed for many philosophically 
interesting issues—for example, why the question of whether machines 
think is more interesting than whether submarines swim—may require  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 Which may have to do, as many have emphasized, with how our mental concepts are 33
elaborately entwined with “reactive” attitudes, as in Strawson (1974), some of which are 
surely innate along lines suggested by the lovely infant experiments of Hamlin et al. I 
argue (1996) that such attitudes lead us to project special properties into humans and 
many animals, precisely along the lines Wittgenstein mentions, that give rise to 
“explanatory gaps.”
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disentangling that project from linguistic semantics. 
Returning to Nenad's concerns: the proposals I've laid out may also be a 
way to realize the “Frutnamian” project he wishes to pursue. The “sense” 
might remain the I-semantic material the HLF delivers to the cognitive 
system, or perhaps the concepts elicited by it; while the “reference” is 
determined by those concepts and the language game in which they are 
deployed. Specifically, in the case of the science language game that 
interests Nenad, (middle) Putnam, Devitt and myself, the I-semantics of 
natural kind terms may consist simply in instructions to the conceptual 
system to find the nearest, real, contrasting natural kind of a term, if there 
is one, to which one is causally connected. And, in the case of empty and 
response-dependent concepts, there may just be the study of the I-
meanings and concepts alone. So, while Nenad may find my view a bit of 
a second shock, he may also regard it as a gift (which, of course, is really 
how I intend it). Again, happy birthday, Nenad, and many happy 
Dubrovnik returns! !!
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